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THE END OF THE VIARSA SAGA AND THE LEGALITY 
OF AUSTRALIA’S VESSEL FORFEITURE PENALTY FOR 
ILLEGAL FISHING IN ITS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
Laurence Blakely† 
Abstract: The world’s fish stocks are suffering from over-utilization.  The earth’s 
oceans are subject to exploitation by all nation states and very little preservation.  
Because of the nature of the international legal regime of the Law of the Sea, 
enforcement of what conservation and management measures exist is challenging.  
Boundaries, ephemeral on land, are even more so on water, making rights allocation and 
management particularly difficult.  Nevertheless, as fish stocks continue to decrease and 
it becomes clearer that oceans require more effective management, coastal states have 
begun to undertake more significant enforcement procedures corresponding to their rights 
in their exclusive economic zones established under the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. 
In particular, Australia has recently implemented a series of measures aimed at 
improving the enforcement of fisheries regulations in its exclusive economic zone.  
Although the motive behind these measures is to attain more effective conservation and 
management of its living marine resources, Australia is pushing the boundaries of 
international law and must endeavor to ensure it acts in conformity with international 
law.  In 1999, Australia amended its Fisheries Management Act to provide for the 
automatic forfeiture of any foreign vessel caught fishing illegally in its exclusive 
economic zone.  Australia can and should interpret this provision to conform to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2007, the infamous Uruguayan-flagged longline fishing 
vessel Viarsa I finally came to rest on the shores of Mumbai and is presently 
standing-by to be demolished and sold as scrap in the Indian ship-breaking 
yards.1  Viarsa I was the object of one of the longest hot pursuits in history,2 
and one so sensational that it was the subject of a widely successful novel by 
a journalist for the Wall Street Journal.3  In August 2003, the Australian 
Fisheries and Customs patrol vessel Southern Supporter chased Viarsa I for 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Craig H. Allen at the University of Washington School 
of Law, the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, and her friends and family. 
1
 Australian Fisheries Management Authority Update, Vol. V, Issue 1, Jan. 15, 2008, 
http://www.afma.gov.au/information/publications/newsletters/afma_update/docs/update_0501/TMPfhjsmu
o5x4.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) [hereinafter AFMA website]. 
2
 The doctrine of hot pursuit allows a coastal state to extend its jurisdiction beyond its exclusive 
economic zone (“EEZ”).  It is codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 111, 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
texts/unclos/closindx.htm [hereinafter LOSC]. 
3
 G. BRUCE KNECHT, HOOKED: PIRATES, POACHING, AND THE PERFECT FISH (Rodale Inc. 2006). 
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twenty-one days over almost 4,000 nautical miles, through an iceberg-strewn 
stormy Southern Ocean in the middle of winter.4  Having detected Viarsa I 
allegedly violating fisheries regulations in Australia’s exclusive economic 
zone (“EEZ”), Southern Supporter initiated hot pursuit, finally catching up 
with Viarsa I in the South Atlantic Ocean and escorting her back to 
Australia.5  Although the crew was eventually acquitted of all criminal 
charges by an Australian jury because evidence of the violation was only 
circumstantial,6 the Commonwealth still confiscated the vessel as forfeited, 
pursuant to section 106A of the Fisheries Management Act (“FMA”).7  The 
owners of the vessel challenged this forfeiture in Australian courts, as 
allowed by the FMA.8  Four years later, the Federal Court of Western 
Australia finally dismissed the Viarsa I owner’s application challenging this 
forfeiture,9 enabling the Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
(“AFMA”) to initiate the dismantling process and bring to a close the Viarsa 
saga.10 
The saga, however, may yet continue.  It remains unclear whether 
Australia’s forfeiture provision, section 106A of the FMA, is consistent with 
international law.  Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (“LOSC”)11 does not specifically address whether forfeiture 
is an allowable method of enforcement of a coastal state’s fisheries 
regulations, in its most recent case, the Tomimaru, the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea, (“ITLOS”), recognized the issue without resolving 
                                           
4
 AFMA website, supra note 1; see also COLTO–Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators website, 
http://www.colto.org/Articles_Latest_Viarsa_Photos.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (providing photo 
account of the hot pursuit). 
5
 Australia claims an EEZ encompassing the waters 200 nautical miles off its coast pursuant to 
LOSC.  LOSC, supra note 2, art. 55 (entitled “Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone”).  A 
coastal state has sovereign rights over the natural resources in its EEZ.  Id. art. 56(1)(a). 
6
 See Ribot-Cabrera & Ors v. The Queen (2004) WASCA 101 (May 18, 2004); Amanda Banks, 
$30m Claim After Fishers Freed, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 7, 2005, at local section p. 4. 
7
 Fisheries Management Act, 1991, C2007C00487, § 106A (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/ (search for “fisheries management act”; then follow “FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT ACT 1991 - SECT 1 Short title” hyperlink; then follow “Management Act” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter FMA] (allowing Australia to claim as automatically forfeited vessels found to have violated 
certain fisheries regulations within Australia’s EEZ). 
8
 AFMA website, supra note 1; Banks, supra note 6. 
9
 Order Entered in the Fed. Ct. of Austl. W. Dist. No. WAD253/2003 (Feb. 27, 2007) (Gilmour, J.) 
available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au (dismissing applicant’s challenge to the forfeiture). 
10
 AFMA website, supra note 1. 
11
 As of February 1, 2008, 155 states have ratified LOSC.  A table recapitulating the status of the 
Convention and of the related Agreements, as of October 26, 2007, is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm (last visited Mar. 4. 
2008). 
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it.12  Presiding ITLOS Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, in his statement to the 
Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly in December 2007, 
described the Tomimaru case as raising questions concerning “the 
confiscation of a vessel and the relation between national and international 
rules.”13  Judge Wolfrum noted on behalf of ITLOS that, although the Law 
of the Sea Convention makes no reference to confiscation provisions, “many 
States have provided for measures of confiscation of fishing vessels in their 
legislation with respect to the management and conservation of marine 
living resources.”14  As such, ITLOS is primed to hear further cases 
regarding confiscation15 measures, rendering Australia’s related enforcement 
actions susceptible to challenge. 
This Comment argues that vessel forfeiture provisions are a valid 
mechanism for coastal states to enforce their laws and regulations as long as 
the provisions do not upset the balance between flag and coastal states rights 
established in Part V of LOSC.16  In particular, Australia’s forfeiture 
provision should be interpreted so as to conform with LOSC.  Part II of this 
Comment exposes illegal fishing and depleting fish stocks as a time sensitive 
worldwide issue and provides an overview of the EEZ, the legal regime 
through which coastal states effectively manage fisheries.  It then introduces 
the ITLOS cases discussing the confiscation issue and lays out the Australian 
forfeiture legislation.  Part III analyzes LOSC Article 73 and ITLOS case 
law to establish that forfeiture is an allowable coastal state enforcement 
measure, as long as it conforms to certain requirements.  Part III then 
proposes a test to determine the legality of forfeiture provisions.  Part IV 
applies this test to the Australian statute, concluding that the statute can, and 
should, be interpreted to conform with international law. 
                                           
12
 The Tomimaru Case (Japan v. Rus. Fed.), Judgment, I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 15, ¶¶ 72-76 (Aug. 6, 
2007) [hereinafter Tomimaru]. 
13
 Rudiger Wolfrum, President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), 
Statement to the Plenary of the Sixty-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Dec. 10, 
2007), at ¶ 22, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “News” hyperlink; then follow 
“Statements of the President” hyperlink) [hereinafter Wolfrum UN Statement]. 
14
 Id. (quoting Tomimaru, supra note 12, ¶ 72). 
15
 Although confiscation is not a familiar term in admiralty, it is used extensively by ITLOS, and 
simply changes the acting party.  For example, the vessel owner forfeits the vessel, and Australia 
confiscates the vessel.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 131, 297 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
16
 See LOSC, supra note 2, Part V entitled “Exclusive Economic Zone.” 
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II. ITLOS CASES HAVE CENTERED AROUND COASTAL STATES’ FISHERIES 
REGULATIONS ENACTED TO ADDRESS DEPLETING FISH STOCKS 
Although many coastal states have adopted forfeiture provisions 
pursuant to their LOSC EEZ powers, ITLOS cases and LOSC articles 
demonstrate the importance of the balance between coastal and flag state 
rights.  ITLOS has heard cases related to coastal state forfeiture provisions 
adopted pursuant to EEZ jurisdiction, but has not ruled on the validity of the 
provisions.  The EEZ regime extends the jurisdiction of coastal states over 
living marine resources.  Growing concerns with illegal fishing, lax flag 
state enforcement, and depleted fish stocks have contributed to the creation 
of the EEZ regime in LOSC. 
A. Illegal Fishing and Depleting Fish Stocks Are Time-Sensitive World-
Wide Problems Exacerbated by Lax Flag State Enforcement 
Fish stocks around the world are depleting rapidly.  Overfishing is 
recognized as a major worldwide problem.17  As of 2005, half of the world’s 
fisheries were deemed fully exploited, one-quarter not quite fully exploited, 
leaving a full one-quarter of the world’s fisheries overexploited, depleted, or 
recovering (seventeen percent, seven percent, and one percent, 
respectively).18  Over the past twenty years, the proportion of depleted and 
overexploited stocks has remained stable following a steep rise in the 1970s 
and 1980s.19  In the mid-1970s, the proportion of overexploited or depleted 
fisheries was only ten percent, as compared to twenty-five percent today.20  
Illegal fishing, as part of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (“IUU”) 
fishing, is a significant contributor to the issue.21 
Lax flag state enforcement persists as a significant challenge in 
curtailing illegal fishing.  Flag states have exclusive jurisdiction over their 
vessels on the high seas, subject to certain exceptions through which other 
states are specifically granted jurisdiction.22  Despite the duty of flag states 
                                           
17
 U.N. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Dep’t, The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 
2006, at 7, U.N. Doc. (2007) [hereinafter SOFIA Report]. 
18
 Id. at 29. 
19
 Id. at 7. 
20
 Id. at 17, 29. 
21
 See generally U.N. FAO, Committee on Fisheries [COFI], Report of the Twenty-Seventh Session 
of the Committee on Fisheries, Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Through 
Monitering, Control and Surveillance, Port State Measures and Other Means, U.N. Doc. E/COFI/2007/7 
(Mar. 5-9, 2007) (discussing the worldwide problem of IUU fishing and the implementation of port state 
measures). 
22
 LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 92, 87; see also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 
208 (3rd ed. 1999) (stating that the EEZ regime grants extensive jurisdiction to the coastal state). 
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to enforce coastal state regulations and comply with relevant Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization (“RFMO”) guidelines onboard their 
vessels, lax enforcement by “flag of convenience”23 states is a widespread 
and global issue—the ramifications of which are felt acutely in the context 
of illegal fishing.24  Under LOSC, flag states have a duty to “comply with 
the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions 
established in the laws and regulations of the coastal state.”25  This imposes 
significant responsibilities on flag states.  Nevertheless, the continued 
widespread use of flags of convenience “exacerbates the extent and scope of 
IUU fishing.”26  The fundamental right of flag state jurisdiction,27 combined 
with lax flag state enforcement, creates further challenges for coastal states 
in implementing fisheries conservation and management measures. 
To make matters worse, illegal fishers are increasingly sophisticated, 
well-funded, and able to work around coastal state conservation and 
management measures.  Organized criminal activity in illegal fishing is 
recognized as a problem around the world.28  In some cases, RFMO 
secretariats have received threats when implementing measures to combat 
IUU fishing, demonstrating the criminal nature of IUU fishing.29  The 
increased sophistication of IUU fishing indicates the highly organized nature 
of the criminal actors and hinders the conservation and management 
measures undertaken by coastal states and the corresponding RFMOs.30  To 
avoid detection, vessel owners create corporate arrangements as a shield 
                                           
23
 Flags of convenience, or open registry vessels, refer to vessels flying the flag of a country other 
than the country of ownership.  See U.N. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Dep’t, “Flag of Convenience” or 
Open Registry Fishing Vessels, http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14818 (last visited Apr. 24, 2008).  These 
have been described as “pirates, bad actors and the scourge of the ocean.”  Id. 
24
 See generally MATHEW GIANNI & WALT SIMPSON, THE CHANGING NATURE OF HIGH SEAS 
FISHING: HOW FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE PROVIDE COVER FOR ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED 
FISHING (Austl. Dep’t of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Int’l Transport Workers’ Federation, WWF 
Int’l, 2005), available at http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/5858/iuu_flags_of_ 
convenience.pdf (discussing the role of flags of convenience in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
(“IUU”) fishing). 
25
 LOSC, supra note 2, art. 62(4). 
26
 SOFIA Report, supra note 17, at 56. 
27
 Flag states traditionally have jurisdiction over their vessels, and exclusive jurisdiction over their 
vessels on the high seas.  See LOSC, supra note 2, art. 87. 
28
 Corporate crime in IUU fishing was a subject of various recent international conferences.  For 
example, the 34th Annual Conference of The Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand 
(Sept. 2007) held a session on “Organized Crime in Australia’s Fishing Industry: International 
Connections.”  Also, the 18th Annual European Association of Fisheries Economists Conference (July 
2007) included a paper entitled:  “Non-Compliance in Fisheries: A Corporate Crime Perspective,” by Linda 
Nostbakken and Frank Jensen.  See generally The XVIIIth Annual EAFE Conference Website, 
http://www.eafe2007.hi.is/index.html (last visited Apr. 24 2008). 
29
 SOFIA Report, supra note 17, at 56. 
30
 Id. 
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against investigations and frequently change vessel names, call numbers, and 
flags.31  In the fight against IUU fishing, this organized corporate element 
adds a significant burden on the coastal states in their endeavor to conserve 
and manage the living resources in their EEZs. 
B. The EEZ Legal Regime Created in LOSC Balances the Interests of the 
Coastal and Flag States 
Over the past several decades, the Law of the Sea has evolved through 
the “creeping jurisdiction” of coastal states beyond their territorial seas and 
into the ocean.32  Previously, most of the world’s oceans were comprised of 
“high seas,” on which flag states possessed exclusive jurisdiction over their 
vessels and all states enjoyed unrestricted access to resources.33  More and 
more states began to claim something akin to an EEZ:  an area of ocean 
contiguous to their territorial seas in which they had jurisdiction over natural 
resources, especially fisheries.34  The drafting of LOSC evolved to provide 
management frameworks and enforcement structures beyond the territorial 
sea, where before flag states exercised exclusive jurisdiction.35  This 
paralleled a growing understanding of, and desire to manage, natural 
resources and marine pollution, as well as a recognition of political theories 
such as the “tragedy of the commons”36 and the “race to the bottom.”37  As a 
result, coastal states today claim sovereign rights 200 miles offshore, 
                                           
31
 See GIANNI & SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 12. 
32
 See generally Barbara Kwiatkowska, Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice, 22 OCEAN DEV. AND INT’L L. 153 (1991) (examining 
the extensions of coastal state rights and jurisdictions beyond the twelve mile territorial sea); see also 
David Freestone, The Effective Conservation and Management of High Seas Living Resources: Towards a 
New Regime?, 5 CANTERBURY L. REV. 341, 343 (1995) (examining the impact of the extension of coastal 
state jurisdiction). 
33
 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the High Seas art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter CHS] (stating that a coastal state’s jurisdiction beyond internal waters is over a 
territorial sea of twelve nautical miles).  High seas are “all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state.”  Id. 
34
 For example, the Truman Proclamation stated the policy of the United States regarding the need 
for conservation zones and protection of fisheries resources, and claimed the right to regulate and control 
fishing activities in these “conservation zones,” while maintaining the right of “free and unimpeded 
navigation.”  2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 493 
(Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985) [hereinafter Nordquist vol. II]. 
35
 See CHS, supra note 33. 
36
 “Tragedy of the commons” is an expression of the conflict between individual interests and the 
common good in the management of finite resources.  Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
SCIENCE MAG., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243. 
37
 “Race to the bottom” is a theoretical phenomenon occurring when competition between states 
leads to a decline in regulatory standards.  The term was coined by Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. 
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933).  For example, in the case of vessel registries, states with fewer 
regulations will attract more vessel registrations, and become “flag of convenience” states. 
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RFMOs assert authority over vast expanses of ocean, and port states 
undertake market control measures.38  Nevertheless, striking a balance 
between the rights of the flag state and those of the coastal state within what 
would become the EEZ remained central to the evolving framework.39 
Ultimately adopting the EEZ as a formal regime, LOSC sought to 
integrate a comprehensive regulation of coastal states’ claims to rights 
beyond their territorial seas.40  Although the regime was created by LOSC, it 
had roots in the earlier conventions.41  The resulting EEZ was arguably the 
most complex and multifaceted regime in LOSC:  an “intricately designed 
structuring of rights, jurisdiction, and duties—variously allocated between 
coastal States and the general community of States.”42  Consequently, 
balancing conflicting rights and interests within the EEZ has proven to be 
tremendously difficult. 
In considering whether to adopt the EEZ regime, a novel concept at 
the time, states were concerned with preserving the fundamental rights of the 
law of the sea:  freedom of fishing and of navigation.  Reports prepared 
while drafting LOSC’s EEZ section reflect the concern among states that an 
extension of the jurisdiction of coastal states beyond the territorial sea would 
“have to be matched by a statement of general rights of the international 
community in that extended zone.”43 
Once again, conserving a balance between coastal and flag states was 
a key part of the section of LOSC that created the EEZ.44  Coastal states, on 
the one hand, have jurisdiction to prescribe enforcement procedures in their 
EEZs under LOSC.45  Prescriptive jurisdiction in the EEZ allows coastal 
states to establish laws and regulations that relate to fisheries and 
enforcement procedures for the conservation and utilization of the living 
resources.46 
Article 73 of LOSC elaborates on the enforcement procedures that a 
coastal state may undertake in its EEZ, setting forth coastal state 
                                           
38
 See generally Judith Swan, Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing: International and 
Regional Developments, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 38 (2006) (discussing international and regional 
port state measures). 
39
 See Nordquist vol. II, supra note 34, 493-500. 
40
 Id. at 496. 
41
 Id. at 493 (citing the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law, Report 
Adopted by the Second Committee, League of Nations, III Acts of the Conference for the Codification of 
International Law, League of Nations Doc. C.351(b).M.145(b) 1930 V., Annex V, at 209). 
42
 Nordquist vol. II, supra note 34, at 508. 
43
 Id. at 496-97. 
44
 LOSC, supra note 2, Part V. 
45
 LOSC, supra note 2, art. 62(4). 
46
 Id. 
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enforcement jurisdiction in respective EEZs while ensuring the flag states’ 
right to “prompt release” actions.47  Paragraph (1) grants coastal states the 
right to “take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and 
judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the 
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.”48 
Flag states, on the other hand, received the assurance of “prompt 
release” to offset this increase in coastal state jurisdiction.  Article 73 
provides that “[a]rrested vessels shall be promptly released upon the posting 
of a reasonable bond or security.”49  By cross-referencing Article 292, 
Article 73 gives the flag state of a vessel the right to bring a “prompt 
release” action in ITLOS to demand its vessel be released by the coastal 
state on certain conditions.50  Article 73 contains additional flag state interest 
safeguards, including the prohibition of imprisonment and corporal 
punishment as a penalty for the violation of a fisheries regulation,51 and a 
requirement that the coastal state notify the flag state of arrests of vessels 
and subsequent punitive measures.52  The notice requirement ensures that the 
flag state can initiate “prompt release” proceedings. 
C. ITLOS Addressed the Confiscation Issue Within Article 292 “Prompt 
Release” Proceedings Brought Pursuant to Vessel Forfeiture Actions 
Annex VI of LOSC establishes ITLOS and charges it with interpreting 
LOSC to resolve disputes between parties to the Convention.53  ITLOS 
applies LOSC, as well as “other international law not incompatible with the 
Convention.”54  The twenty-one elected members of ITLOS must have the 
highest reputation for “fairness and integrity” and “a recognized competence 
in the field of the law of the sea.”55  In addition, “equitable geographical 
distribution” and representation on ITLOS of the world’s principal legal 
                                           
47
 Prompt release is a “procedure provided by [LOSC], introduced before a court or an international 
tribunal . . . by the flag State whose vessel is detained by the authorities of a State party to the convention, 
which alleges a violation of the provisions of the Convention providing for the prompt release.”  Erik 
Franckx, “Reasonable Bond” in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CAL. 
W. INT’L L. J. 303, 310, n.40 (2002). 
48
 LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(1). 
49
 Id. art. 73(2). 
50
 This procedure is referred to as a “‘prompt release’ proceeding” throughout this Comment.  See 
infra Part II.C. 
51
 LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(3). 
52
 Id. art. 73(4). 
53
 Id. art. 293, Annex VI, art. 23.  ITLOS is one of several available forums for compulsory dispute 
resolution provided for in LOSC Part XV.  See generally Frankx, supra note 47 (discussing dispute 
resolution provided for in LOSC). 
54
 LOSC, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 23 (referring to LOSC art. 293). 
55
 Id. 
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systems are assured,56 and no two members may be nationals of the same 
state.57  As such, ITLOS represents an impartial and significant authority in 
LOSC interpretation. 
ITLOS has heard several “prompt release” proceedings brought 
because of coastal state actions confiscating foreign vessels pursuant to 
forfeiture provisions.58  Article 292 grants ITLOS compulsory jurisdiction to 
resolve “prompt release” disputes, including ones in which a flag state 
alleges that a coastal state did not comply with its duty under Article 73(2) 
(to release a seized vessel upon the posting of a “reasonable bond”), and 
demands that it do so.59 
The procedural posture, however, prevented ITLOS from ruling on the 
merits of any of these cases;60 thus, the judgments did not directly address 
the legality of the confiscation provisions.  ITLOS jurisdiction in “prompt 
release” cases is limited to dealing “only with the question of release, 
without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic 
forum against the vessel.”61  Furthermore, it is in ITLOS’s interest to deliver 
narrow holdings to increase its credibility among states parties and the 
international community.62  Judgments from “prompt release” actions 
therefore usually do not relate to factual and legal issues involved in a 
forfeiture proceeding.  Instead, the judgments deal solely with the immediate 
issue of what a “reasonable bond” for the release of a vessel is in a given 
case. 
Nevertheless, because so many “prompt release” cases litigated in 
ITLOS have stemmed directly from a coastal state claiming a vessel as 
forfeited pursuant to its fisheries regulations, a discussion of these cases is 
relevant.  In addition, this litigation has produced many separate opinions 
that discuss the legal and factual specificities of coastal state vessel 
forfeiture provisions.  In their decisions, members of ITLOS take the 
opportunity to express themselves in separate opinions.  For example, the 




 LOSC, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 3(1). 
58
 See, e.g., Tomimaru, supra note 12; The Hoshinmaru Case (Jap. v. Rus. Fed.), I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 
14 (Aug. 6, 2007); The Juno Trader Case (St. Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau), I.T.L.O.S. 
Case No. 13 (Dec. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Juno Trader]; The Volga Case (Rus. Fed. v. Austl.), I.T.L.O.S. 
Case No. 11 (Dec. 23, 2002); The Grand Prince Case (Belize v. Fr.), I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 8 (Apr. 20, 
2001); available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “Proceedings and Judgments” hyperlink). 
59
 LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 73, 292. 
60
 Id. art. 292. 
61
 Id. art. 292(3). 
62
 See John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 
157 (1998). 
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Juno Trader case produced eight separate opinions signed by ten judges.63  
Unlike ITLOS judgments, which are generally narrow, the separate opinions 
tend to be a bit more expansive.  These separate opinions are also valuable 
analytical resources as reflections by highly qualified authorities on the law 
of the sea.64 
Out of the nine “prompt release” cases heard by ITLOS in the course 
of its existence,65 four deserve special attention because they deal 
specifically with vessels forfeited to a coastal state due to that coastal state’s 
LOSC enforcement jurisdiction.66  The Tomimaru case, ITLOS’s most 
recent, involved Japan, the flag state, filing a case against Russia, the coastal 
state, after Russia confiscated the Tomimaru as forfeited pursuant to its 
fisheries regulations in its EEZ.67  After boarding the vessel, the Russian 
authorities assessed that the vessel had caught more fish than its permit 
allowed.68  Litigation ensued within the Russian court system, culminating 
with the Russian Supreme Court’s denial of Japan’s appeal to the lower 
court’s forfeiture finding.69  This appeal was pending when Japan instituted 
proceedings at ITLOS, and was denied by the time ITLOS rendered its 
judgment.70  As such, this case provides insight on ITLOS’s treatment of a 
“prompt release” action due to vessel forfeiture while a proceeding is taking 
place in a coastal state’s domestic courts. 
Because the facts of the Volga case involved the application of 
Australia’s forfeiture provision discussed in this Comment, the Volga 
opinions are relevant.  Even though the Australian forfeiture statute was 
implicated in the Volga case, ITLOS did not rule on its legality.71  Instead, 
the case centered on the nature of the bond Australia demanded as a 
                                           
63
 Juno Trader, supra note 58.  Judges Kolodin, Anderson, Cot, Part, Meshaw, Wolfrum, 
Chandresekhara Rao, Treves, Ndiaye, and Lucky all filed declarations or separate opinions. 
64
 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
65
 ITLOS heard its first case in 1997 (The Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 1 
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http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “Proceedings and Judgments” hyperlink) (last visited May 12, 
2008). 
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 Tomimaru, supra note 12; Juno Trader, supra note 58; Volga, supra note 58; Grand Prince, supra 
note 58. 
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 Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶¶ 26, 44. 
68
 Id. Judgment ¶ 25. 
69
 Id. Judgment ¶¶ 37-46. 
70
 Id. Judgment ¶ 62. 
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 See Volga, supra note 58, Judgment ¶¶ 50, 76 (citing the Australian statute applied in the case and 
stating:  “it is not appropriate in the present proceedings to consider whether a coastal State is entitled to 
impose such conditions in the exercise of its sovereign rights under the Convention.”); but see id. Separate 
Opinion of Judge Cot, ¶¶ 11-13 (stating that Australia’s enforcement and prevention measures fall within 
LOSC and international organizations’ efforts to combat IUU fishing). 
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condition on the release of the vessel.72  Russia, this time acting as the flag 
state, brought the action to ITLOS.73  The Volga had been forfeited pursuant 
to FMA section 106A for a violation of Australia’s fisheries regulations, and 
the owners contested the forfeiture in Australian courts while the flag state 
brought the ITLOS case.74  Because the forfeiture case was still pending in 
Australia when ITLOS rendered its decision, the Volga facts substantially 
differ from the Tomimaru facts.75  However, like in the Tomimaru case, 
ITLOS had to deal with possible complementarity issues due the ongoing 
domestic court proceeding.76  This relationship between ITLOS and 
domestic proceedings is key when analyzing the legality of a forfeiture 
provision. 
The Grand Prince similarly involved a coastal state’s forfeiture 
provision, this time France’s.77  Unlike the Volga and the Tomimaru cases, 
where the judgments were unanimous, this case prompted a significant 
dissent.  Nine of the twenty-one judges disagreed with the tribunal’s finding 
that Belize was not the flag state of the vessel.78  They expressed regret that 
such a finding prevented the tribunal from considering, as a legal question, 
the relationship between “prompt release” proceedings under Article 292 and 
“the merits of cases before the domestic forum of the detaining State,”79 
indicating their interest in resolving the issue under ITLOS jurisdiction. 
In the Juno Trader, ITLOS touched on notions of international due 
process standards.  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines brought the action 
against Guinea-Bissau for the release of the Juno Trader, which Guinea-
Bissau had seized pursuant to a fisheries regulation infraction.80  ITLOS 
unanimously found that Guinea-Bissau had not complied with LOSC Article 
73(2) and ordered Guinea-Bissau to release the seized vessel.81  Several of 
the separate opinions also expressed concern over the lack of due process in 
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 Id. Judgment ¶ 76. 
73
 Id. Judgment ¶ 1. 
74
 Olbers Co. Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl. & Ors. (No. 4) (2004) 205 A.L.R. 432 (Austl.), aff’d, 
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 Grand Prince, supra note 58, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caminos, Rangel, Yankov, 
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the Guinean proceedings.82  Significant to the decision was that Guinea-
Bissau did not provide notice of the seizure to the flag state.83  The Juno 
Trader provides an example of a possibly illegal forfeiture provision. 
Although ITLOS has heard litigation due to forfeiture provisions, it 
has not actually held that they are allowed or what type is allowed.  
However, the separate and dissenting opinions provide some guidance for 
determining the legality of a coastal state’s forfeiture provision.  The Juno 
Trader, the Grand Prince, the Volga, and the Tomimaru were all brought to 
ITLOS due to a coastal state’s forfeiture proceedings.  These cases present 
various possible factual scenarios relating to forfeiture provisions and 
provide reference points for a possible legal test.84 
D. Australia Has Enacted a Confiscation Provision Pursuant to Its 
Sovereign Right to Conserve and Manage the Living Resources in Its 
EEZ 
In accordance with the LOSC article granting coastal states the power 
to prescribe enforcement measures in their EEZs, Australia sets forth 
enforcement mechanisms against illegal fishing in the Fisheries 
Management Act.85  Administrators of the Act are charged with ensuring that 
the conservation and management measures in Australia’s EEZ and on the 
high seas “implement Australia’s obligations under international agreements 
that deal with fish stocks.”86  This language indicates a link between 
Australia’s domestic law and the international agreements it is party to, 
including LOSC.  Section 106A of the FMA provides for automatic 
“forfeiture of things used in certain offences,” including vessels used for 
IUU fishing in the EEZ, and their catch.87  The Australian legislature added 
the “automatic” nature of the forfeiture provision when it amended the FMA 
in 1999.88 
The FMA sets forth procedures in confiscating a foreign vessel fishing 
illegally.  Section 106C of the Act requires the enforcement officer to give 
written notice of the seizure.89  The notice must contain information on how 
                                           
82
 Id. at Separate Opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum ¶¶ 5-6; id. at Separate Opinion of Judge 
Chandrasekhara Rao ¶ 8. 
83
 Id. at Judgment ¶ 76. 
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 See infra Part III.B. 
85
 LOSC, supra note 2, art. 62(4)(k); FMA, supra note 7. 
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 FMA, supra note 7, Part 1(3)(2)(c). 
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 Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 1999. 
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 FMA, supra note 7, § 106C. 
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to challenge the forfeiture of the seized vessel and include the address of the 
Managing Director of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, 
(“AFMA”), to whom a claim challenging the forfeiture must be made.90  
Once the claim is made, the claimant has two months to institute 
proceedings in Australian courts to enforce it.91  If the claimant does not 
obtain a court order, the seized vessel is forfeited to the Commonwealth.92 
The AFMA is charged with implementing the FMA.  As such, it is the 
body responsible for instituting forfeiture proceedings, or in the case of an 
automatic forfeiture, responding to a flag state or owner’s challenge to the 
forfeiture.  Once the vessel is forfeited, the AFMA must dispose of it.  The 
AFMA has various mechanisms for managing the confiscation 
proceedings.93 
In sum, LOSC created a regime, the EEZ, which allocates sovereign 
rights over natural resources in the EEZ to coastal states, while protecting 
flag states’ rights through “prompt release” actions.  A coastal state’s right to 
implement a forfeiture provision specifically is not established as legal, but 
ITLOS has heard litigation related to such clauses.94  Although many states 
have implemented forfeiture provisions, Australia’s is unique because it is 
“automatic.” 
III. CONFISCATION IS A VALID EXERCISE OF A COASTAL STATE’S SOVEREIGN 
RIGHTS, PROVIDED IT PRESERVES FLAG STATES’ RIGHTS 
Although the confiscation of vessels is not specifically provided for in 
Article 73, it is also not prohibited.95  Because it is not prohibited by LOSC, 
the confiscation of fishing vessels as a penalty for illegal fishing within an 
EEZ is consistent with Article 73.96  In its most recent case, ITLOS 
recognized that many states do have forfeiture provisions aimed at 
prevention and deterrence of illegal fishing activities.97  Undisputed state 
practice supports this,98 as many states other than Australia also have 
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 Id. § 106D. 
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confiscation provisions.99  An analysis of pertinent LOSC articles and past 
ITLOS litigation presents a possible two-part test for determining the 
legality of a forfeiture provision:  it may not deny a flag state access to a 
“prompt release” action, and it must grant access to a domestic forum in 
which the flag state can effectively challenge the forfeiture.  These two 
prongs encompass the overarching goals of conserving the balance between 
coastal and flag states’ rights and ensuring some level of due process. 
A. A Textual Analysis of Article 73 Indicates That Confiscation Is a Valid 
Enforcement Measure 
Article 73 allows a coastal state to “take such measures, including 
boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to 
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity 
with this Convention,” in the exercise of its sovereign rights over the living 
resources in the EEZ.100 
1. The List of Enforcement Measures in Article 73(1) Is Non-Exhaustive 
Article 73(1) is a non-exhaustive list of allowable coastal state 
enforcement measures.  Although the acting phrase “boarding, inspection, 
arrest, and judicial proceedings” is not preceded by the words inter alia or 
the like, interpreting the list as non-exhaustive is consistent with the 
language in Article 73.101  That the drafting committee included inter alia in 
its list of allowable coastal state laws and regulations in Article 62(4)102 does 
not necessarily mean that the absence of these words in Article 73(1) 
indicates the list is exhaustive.  The list in Article 62(4) is much longer than 
the one in Article 73(1) and relates to a more general allowance of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, which allocates the right to enact laws and 
regulations, as opposed to enforcement jurisdiction, which allocates the right 
to enforce laws and regulations.  The different nature of the two articles 
explains the different language.  The subsections of Article 73 also suggest 
that the omission of the specific term was not intended to limit enforcement 
actions to those enumerated in the article.103  This is further supported by the 
fact that several ITLOS judges believe that the list is non-exhaustive.  In 
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fact, some have even stated specifically that vessel confiscation is 
allowed.104 
Article 73(3) specifically enumerates prohibited coastal state 
enforcement measures, further indicating that the list in paragraph 1 is non-
exhaustive.  Coastal state penalties for violations of their fisheries 
regulations “may not include imprisonment . . . or any other form of corporal 
punishment.”105  As such, one can reason that what is not prohibited is 
allowed. 
2. The Language in Article 73 Allocates Broader Enforcement Power to 
Coastal States Regarding Living Resources than Other LOSC Articles 
Relating to the Enforcement Jurisdiction of Coastal States 
LOSC grants enforcement jurisdiction to coastal states in several 
different contexts.  In particular, LOSC Articles 220 and 230 address 
enforcement of marine environment pollution and protection in the EEZ.106  
As compared to these enforcement articles in LOSC, Article 73 grants more 
expansive rights and discretion to the coastal state.  The language is 
considerably stronger than that of other articles in LOSC that relate to 
enforcement measures, indicating the drafting committee’s desire to grant 
the broadest enforcement powers in the case of living resources.  This 
resonates with conservation concerns driving the creation of the EEZ.107  
Enforcement measures relating to protection of the marine environment in 
the EEZ are restricted to “monetary penalties.”108  Similarly, enforcement 
jurisdiction of coastal states for the “protection and preservation of the 
marine environment” only allows for the detention of vessels, as opposed to 
the arrest allowed in Article 73.109 
Article 73 grants discretion to the coastal state to determine the limits 
of its enforcement jurisdiction pursuant to its sovereign rights over living 
resources in its EEZ.  Unlike Article 220, which requires that there be “clear 
grounds for believing that a foreign vessel while navigating in the EEZ has 
committed a violation,”110 Article 73 allows the state to take measures “as 
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may be necessary” to ensure compliance with its laws and regulations 
relating to living resources.111  Indeed, this “as may be necessary” limit to 
enforcement procedures grants discretion to determine what may be 
necessary to the coastal state, resulting in a broad grant of power to that 
state. 
The drafting committee repeatedly opted to allow for broader 
enforcement jurisdiction in Article 73, as compared to those in other LOSC 
articles providing for enforcement jurisdiction.112  The term “boarding” 
implies going on board a ship for enforcement purposes, including the use of 
armed forces.113  Article 73 also specifically allows for “arrest” of vessels, 
rather than limiting state action to “detention.”  This is significant because it 
marks a deliberate permission of in rem actions against the ship or vessel 
under Article 73, which the committee declined to provide in Article 220.114  
The limitation of “inspection” to the examination of certain documents in 
Article 220 is similarly not present in Article 73, once again indicating 
broader allowance to the coastal state under the latter article.  In sum, when 
given an option between broad language and limiting language, the 
committee chose to use broad, power-conferring language in Article 73.  It is 
nevertheless important to note that Article 73 was drafted by a different 
committee than Articles 220 and 230.115 
3. The Lotus Case Principle Further Supports This Interpretation of 
Article 73 
Finally, the Lotus case stands for the international law principle that 
what is not prohibited by international law is allowed, supporting the non-
exhaustive interpretation of Article 73(1).  In S.S. Lotus, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (predecessor to the International Court of 
Justice) held that the burden was on the moving party to establish a positive 
restraint on the other state’s sovereignty.116  This has been interpreted to 
mean that restrictions upon the independence of a state cannot be presumed; 
rather, the international legal system is permissive—where states may act 
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when not prohibited to do so.117  In applying this principle to a coastal state’s 
enforcement jurisdiction in its EEZ, one could conclude that the list of 
prohibited actions in paragraph four indicates that what is not on the list is 
permitted. 
B. ITLOS Litigation Suggests the Validity of Confiscation Provisions by 
Allowing Them to Continue Functioning 
In the Tomimaru case, ITLOS dealt specifically with confiscation 
provisions and the relationship between national and international rules.118  
In observing that the confiscation of a vessel must not upset the balance 
between coastal and flag states’ rights, ITLOS implied that confiscation 
provisions are allowable under LOSC.119  This implication is further 
supported by the final judgment:  in Tomimaru, the domestic court of the 
coastal state’s final decision regarding the confiscation of the vessel 
rendered the flag state’s application for “prompt release” without object.120  
Thus, the Russian Supreme Court’s judgment was final. 
Unlike the Tomimaru case, in which the domestic proceedings were 
final before ITLOS rendered its judgment, the Volga proceedings were 
pending in Australian federal court at the time of judgment.121  Ostensibly, 
this is why the “prompt release” action was not deemed rendered without 
object by the finality of the confiscation action as in the Tomimaru case.122  
ITLOS is preserving its own discretion in this regard, relying on the 
balancing of the coastal and flag states’ rights on a case-by-case basis 
instead of establishing a bright line rule. 
Still, the Tomimaru judgment suggests some limitations on coastal 
state forfeiture provisions.  Even though vessel forfeiture appears to be 
lawful according to ITLOS, there are limitations imposed on this type of 
measure.  Most importantly, the confiscation measure must not upset the 
balance between coastal and flag states’ rights.123  This view, espoused by 
ITLOS, is consistent as one of the guiding principles in the EEZ regime 
established in LOSC.124  Although no legal instrument provides specific 
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rules to follow to conserve this balance within a confiscation proceeding,125 
ITLOS judgments and separate opinions offer some guidance as to what to 
look for in ensuring adequate protection of the flag state’s rights.  These 
documents, along with a careful reading of Article 73, provide a framework 
within which to formulate a test for determining the validity of a forfeiture 
provision. 
C. A Suggested Test for Determining the Validity of a Forfeiture 
Provision 
Recent ITLOS decisions, undisputed state practice, and the language 
in Article 73 demonstrate that the confiscation of vessels as an enforcement 
measure within a coastal state’s EEZ conforms with international law.  An 
analysis of these same sources provides a possible test for determining the 
legality of such a provision. 
1. A Confiscation Provision May Not Have the Effect of Denying a Flag 
State Access to a “Prompt Release” Action 
Although the effect of confiscation may vary, such a provision would 
certainly be invalid if it had the effect of preventing the flag state from 
invoking its right to a “prompt release” action before ITLOS.  By prohibiting 
certain enforcement measures and ensuring a flag state’s right to a “prompt 
release” action, Article 73 safeguards the balance of interest between coastal 
and flag states.126  It is logical that a coastal state measure undertaken 
pursuant to its enforcement jurisdiction granted by Article 73 may not 
undermine a flag state’s access to a “prompt release” action.  ITLOS stated 
that the forfeiture provision must not simply be a means to prevent the flag 
state from bringing a “prompt release” action.127  The language in this dicta 
introduces an element of intent, pointing to the reasoning behind forfeiture 
legislation as helpful in the analysis of legality.  The forfeiture proceeding, 
therefore, must not interfere with the function of Article 292, nor must it 
intend to.128  This is not to say that a law that unintentionally short-circuited 
“prompt release” would be valid; rather, the intention of a law can assist in 
determining the effect it may have. 
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According to ITLOS, a final confiscation action in a domestic forum 
renders a “prompt release” action without object.129  This conforms with 
ITLOS’s previous assertion that it is not “an appellate forum against a 
decision of a national court,”130 and with international tribunals’ treatment of 
complementarity:  a traditional policy of non-interference with domestic 
adjudication.131  In contrast, ITLOS declined to hold that it could not hear 
“prompt release” actions related to cases pending in domestic fora, albeit 
amid dissent.132  This necessarily follows from the requirement that a 
forfeiture provision not impede an Article 292 action.  If a case pending in a 
domestic forum estopped ITLOS’s ability to hear a related “prompt release” 
claim, the forfeiture action would necessarily affect the operation of Article 
292. 
Similarly, Russia’s contention in Tomimaru that the nationality of a 
vessel is affected by a confiscation measure cannot stand to the requirement 
that a forfeiture provision not affect the operation of Article 292.133  Russia 
argued that the flag state of the vessel was no longer Japan because the 
vessel had been forfeited to Russia.134  Because this would effectively 
prevent the original flag state from bringing a “prompt release” action, 
upsetting the balance between coastal and flag states’ rights, ITLOS rejected 
this argument.135  Article 92 states that a vessel may not change its flag in the 
course of a voyage, except in the case of a “real transfer of ownership or 
change of registry.”136  Even though this seems to indicate a connection 
between ownership and nationality, it does not prescribe such a connection.  
Because the nationality of a vessel does not depend on the nationality of the 
owner,137 a coastal state can claim a vessel as forfeited without changing its 
nationality.  Even if the coastal state is the new owner of the vessel, it does 
not automatically become the flag state.  To the contrary, interpreting a 
forfeiture provision to affect the nationality of a vessel would be inconsistent 
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with LOSC.  Because nationality and ownership of vessels are distinct, it is 
possible to conclude that forfeiture does not affect a vessel’s nationality. 
2. The Forfeiture Procedure Must Grant Effective Access to a Domestic 
Forum in Which to Challenge the Forfeiture, Ensuring Some Due 
Process 
ITLOS has indicated that a confiscation measure that frustrates the 
possibility of recourse to domestic remedies would violate international 
standards of due process.138  Accordingly, a forfeiture provision must 
provide concerned parties recourse to available domestic remedies.  Giving 
the flag state notice and time to respond to the action, in conformity with 
international standards for due process of law, will help ensure that this 
recourse is effective. 
Article 73(4) requires coastal states to provide notice to the flag state 
in case of arrest or detention, and of any further punitive measures it 
takes.139  The notification must take place via “appropriate channels.”140  As 
such, a notice requirement should figure into the due process analysis. 
Like all enforcement measures, a forfeiture provision must not deny 
due process of law.  ITLOS noted in the Tomimaru case that Japan did not 
claim that the Russian proceedings were inconsistent with international 
standards of due process of law, implying that had the argument been made, 
ITLOS would have considered the issue.141  In his separate opinion, Judge 
Lucky reasoned that Russia’s proceedings were consistent with international 
standards of due process and recommended that ITLOS adopt a presumption 
in favor of a state’s domestic proceedings.142  In contrast, separate opinions 
in the Juno Trader case suggested that the Guinean proceedings did not 
provide due process of law.143  Because ITLOS dismissed that action on 
procedural grounds, the issue was not litigated.  Still, ITLOS seems to 
conflate a due process analysis with the availability of a domestic forum in 
which to challenge the forfeiture, and the adequacy of that forum. 
Although there is no test for the effectiveness of the access to the 
domestic courts, ITLOS suggests that the Russian proceedings in the 
Tomimaru were sufficient, whereas those in the Juno Trader were not.  This 
spectrum, combined with a notice requirement, provides a framework within 
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which to analyze the effectiveness of the domestic courts as a forum in 
which to challenge a vessel forfeiture. 
The fact that Russia allowed Japan to contest the forfeiture in its court 
system aided ITLOS in ruling that the “prompt release” was without object.  
In fact, ITLOS found it significant that Japan had waited so long before 
bringing the application to ITLOS.144  A flag state’s prolonged delay defeats 
the purpose behind a “prompt release” action—“prompt release” is meant to 
ensure timeliness of process.   Several separate opinions also suggested that 
the access to the Russian courts aided the determination that there was no 
due process violation.145 
In sum, a vessel forfeiture provision, to be legal, must not deny a flag 
state’s right to an Article 292 “prompt release” action and must grant 
effective access to a domestic forum in which to contest the forfeiture of the 
vessel.  Although these elements overlap, response to litigation brought 
before ITLOS suggests that they should factor into the analysis separately.  
As the “effectiveness” test of the access to the domestic forum helps to 
ensure compliance with international due process standards, the right to a 
“prompt release” action similarly helps to balance coastal and flag states’ 
rights. 
IV. AUSTRALIA’S FORFEITURE PROVISION CAN AND SHOULD BE 
INTERPRETED IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS TEST 
FMA section 106A provides for the automatic forfeiture of vessels 
fishing illegally.146  Part IV of this Comment applies the test established in 
Part III to Australia’s statute, and argues that section 106A does not deny a 
flag state access to an Article 292 “prompt release” action and that it 
provides a domestic forum in which an interested party may effectively 
contest the forfeiture.  Because the automatic nature of the Australian statute 
deserves special attention, a separate analysis of the effect of this feature is 
appropriate prior to the application of the test. 
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A. The Automatic Nature of the Provision, Albeit Untraditional, Is Not 
Dispositive of Legality 
Although the automatic nature of Australia’s forfeiture provision 
could seem too extreme to meet international standards for due process, both 
the motivation behind the amendment and the subsequent application of the 
provision mitigate such concerns.  The motivation behind this legislation is 
significant in that, according to ITLOS dicta, the reason for its existence 
cannot be to prevent “prompt release” actions.147  Circumstances indicate 
that the FMA amendment was prompted by one specific case, the Aliza 
Glacial litigation.148  In Aliza Glacial, because Australia’s interest in the 
vessel was merely a potential interest dependent on the conviction of a crew 
member, the Australian courts found it subject to the interest of the mortgage 
holder, a Norwegian bank.149  As such, the purpose of the automatic nature 
of the forfeiture provision is to ensure that Australian conservation and 
management enforcement measures, such as investigations and judicial 
action, are not frustrated by third parties such as foreign mortgagees,150 and 
not to frustrate flag state actions for “prompt release.”151 
Similarly, the effect of the automatic nature of the provision is not to 
prevent owners or flag states from contesting forfeiture.  Indeed, the AFMA, 
charged with applying forfeitures, has explicitly stated its understanding that 
Australia must comply with LOSC.152  In the same vein, the AFMA lays out 
procedures for challenging forfeiture within Australia, if the owner or 
another interested party wishes to do so, demonstrating conformity with at 
least basic notions of due process.153 
B. The Australian Legislation Does Not Deny a Flag State Access to a 
“Prompt Release” Action 
The FMA amendment providing for automatic vessel forfeiture was 
intended to hold illegal fishing beneficiaries responsible, not to prevent 
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“prompt release” actions.154  Indeed, successful “prompt release” actions 
continued to be brought after the 1999 amendment to the FMA.  In 
particular, the Volga case litigated in ITLOS demonstrates that Australia 
does not intend to deprive flag states of their right to “prompt release” 
actions.  When the Volga was seized and forfeited, Russia, the flag state, 
instituted “prompt release” proceedings in ITLOS.155  In simply arguing that 
the bond it was requesting was reasonable, Australia did not in any way 
attempt to challenge Russia’s ability to bring the action.156  In addition, 
Australia released the crew on bail, in compliance with Article 73(3).157  
This could be recognized as a demonstration of good faith. 
Australian courts have also suggested that the automatic nature of the 
confiscation provision is not intended to disable a flag state’s “prompt 
release” action.158  Instead, it gives Australia the ability to seek recognition 
of its title to the vessel in other jurisdictions through foreign legal 
processes.159  The court further proposed that this could offset the problem of 
IUU fishers fleeing to the high seas by making the title to the vessel 
“insecure” in any jurisdiction that would recognize Australia’s title, helping 
to close the accountability gap in IUU fishing.160  This view has been 
espoused by Australian politicians and fisheries administrators.161  Senator 
Ian MacDonald, Australian Fisheries Minister from 2002 until 2006, 
suggested that seizing vessels in foreign ports as forfeited would be a 
desirable method of upholding the automatic forfeitures.162  Importantly, he 
also indicated that this could and would be done with international 
cooperation.163 
Although the AFMA’s position on the issue of vessel nationality is 
unclear, it has stated that Australia is subject to LOSC, which provides 
obligations consistent with only certain interpretations of nationality rules.  
In its 2006-2007 yearly report, the AFMA referred to “the previously 
Uruguayan flagged Viarsa I.”164  This could suggest, somewhat 
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problematically, that the administration is claiming that the nationality of the 
vessel has changed as a result of the forfeiture.  However, this same 
administrative body also asserted that “[u]nder [LOSC], Australia is obliged 
to return vessels to owners on payment of a bond,”165 indicating the AFMA’s 
understanding that Australia is bound to allow “prompt release” actions by 
the flag states of vessels seized by Australia as automatically forfeited.  It 
also means that Australia is not claiming that a change in ownership results 
in a change in nationality.  In the Viarsa I case, Australia may have changed 
the registry of the vessel once the court dismissed the owner’s challenge to 
the automatic forfeiture.  This way Australia’s title to the vessel, although 
valid pending a decision on the challenge, is still subject to certain rights 
possessed by the previous owner and flag state.  As such, a coastal state 
could legitimately change the nationality of a forfeited vessel once the 
forfeiture is in fact final.  It seems that the AFMA is making a distinction 
between its rights after an automatic forfeiture but prior to a final ruling and 
its rights after a final ruling on the forfeiture, thus conserving the original 
flag state’s rights to a “prompt release” action. 
Section 106A of the FMA, providing for the automatic forfeiture of a 
vessel and its catch upon the commission of the listed infractions in the EEZ, 
can be interpreted to conform to the standards set by ITLOS, but Australia 
must do this. 
C. Australia’s Forfeiture Provision Establishes Procedures to Ensure 
That the Access to Its Domestic Courts Is Effective 
The FMA provides for effective notice, response time, and sets out 
specific procedures through which to challenge the forfeiture of a vessel, 
ensuring a minimum standard of due process in the Australian automatic 
vessel forfeiture provision.  Furthermore, a vessel may only be seized if 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that it has indeed been used in 
committing a fisheries offense.166 
The Australian forfeiture provision requires officials to provide 
“effective notice” to the owner of the forfeited vessel upon seizure.167  
Because Article 73(4) requires the notice to be given to the flag state through 
“appropriate channels,” notice to the owners of the vessel is arguably 
sufficient.  Owners are aware of the “prompt release” proceedings and the 
necessary role of the flag state, and will therefore notify the flag state of the 
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coastal state action.168  Although the statute would certainly be stronger if it 
required notice to be given to the flag state specifically, notice to the owner 
is certainly effective, and arguably an “appropriate channel.”  As such, the 
notice Section 106C of the Act prescribes complies with Article 73(4). 
This notification method is especially appropriate in light of the 
option for a party to bring a “prompt release” action on behalf of the flag 
state of a vessel that exists in Article 292.169  This grants private parties 
access to a forum which is traditionally reserved for states.  Many “prompt 
release” actions have been brought pursuant to this quasi-private right to act 
on behalf of the flag state.  In fact, all but one of the Patagonian toothfish 
“prompt release” cases were brought “on behalf” of the flag state, and not by 
the flag state itself.170  This supports the claim that notifying the owner of a 
vessel will result in effective notification of the flag state because the owner 
and flag state must work together. 
In addition, the FMA gives owners thirty days to file a claim 
contesting the forfeiture,171 effectively giving the owner the time to respond 
(which is suggested as a requirement in ITLOS dicta).172  Once a claim is 
filed, the owner must institute proceedings in Australian courts within two 
months.173  The two months response time provided by FMA Section 106F 
allows the owner, the flag state, or other interested parties time to seek 
enforcement of their claim contesting vessel forfeiture in Australian courts. 
The Viarsa I case exposes the difference in evidentiary standards 
between criminal and civil cases.  In that case, the difference in the standard 
required to prove the alleged violation was dispositive of the outcomes of 
the civil and criminal proceedings.  In fact, the legality of this forfeiture 
could depend on the judge’s reasoning in his dismissal of the claim.  This 
case is interesting because evidence of the violation was not sufficient to 
convict the crew on criminal charges, supporting the owner’s claim that the 
forfeiture was unlawful.  Because the claim was dismissed, the standard of 
proof applied by the judge in the civil forfeiture proceeding must have been 
lower than for the criminal proceeding.  While there was no judgment on the 
dismissal of the claim, there is a paper trail of hearings and orders entered, 
demonstrating the owner’s recourse to the domestic courts in which to 
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challenge the forfeiture. 174  Still, it would be interesting to know whether the 
dismissal was based on a finding that a violation did in fact occur.  The FMA 
does require a finding of reasonable belief that a violation did occur prior to 
seizing a vessel, mitigating these concerns.175 
Still, unlike Guinea-Bissau’s confiscation procedures at issue in Juno 
Trader, the Australian forfeiture provision establishes procedures through 
which ship owners, flag states, and other interested parties can challenge the 
legal or factual bases for the administrative decision giving rise to forfeiture.  
As such, it is unlikely that ITLOS would find Australia’s notice procedures 
inadequate or its domestic proceedings not in conformity with international 
standards of due process. 
D. Australian Case Law Demonstrates That the Forfeiture Legislation 
Grants Effective Access to a Domestic Forum in Which to Challenge 
the Confiscation 
The FMA sets forth the procedures through which to resolve a dispute 
over a forfeiture action.176  Not only does it provide an avenue for contesting 
forfeiture,177 but case law amply demonstrates that Australia grants owners 
of confiscated vessels and other interested parties access to a domestic 
forum.  Parties may challenge the forfeiture on legal grounds as well as 
factual grounds.  They may either use the forfeiture contest procedure to 
establish that the relevant fisheries offense did not occur or use the 
Australian domestic courts to challenge a legal aspect of the statute.  Indeed, 
several cases have been litigated in this manner in the Australian federal 
courts, contesting both legal and factual determinations.178 
In Scandinavian Bunkering AS v. Bunkers on Board the Ship SV 
Taruman and Others,179 the plaintiffs questioned the operation of FMA 
Section 106A.  The issue in that case was whether the fuel bunkers on board 
the confiscated vessel were legally confiscated as part of “the boat” as the 
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term is used in the governing statute.180  The court determined that they were 
part of the boat and as such legally forfeited along with the vessel.181 
The corporate owners of the Volga, Olbers, also brought several suits 
in Australian Federal Court, culminating in the dismissal of Olbers’ appeal to 
the full federal court.182  The Olbers proceedings in Australian courts were 
similar to the Russian proceedings in Tomimaru, which were impliedly 
upheld by the entire ITLOS, and explicitly by Judge Lucky.183  Like the 
Russian plaintiffs, Olbers chose to litigate in the domestic forum.  Olbers 
advanced multiple arguments ranging from the constitutionality of Section 
106A to contesting the factual determination that the Volga had been fishing 
in the Australian EEZ.184  As demonstrated, foreign owners and other 
interested parties are granted access to the Australian domestic courts to 
challenge legal and factual issues related to vessel forfeiture. 
E. Australia Should Ensure That Interpretation of FMA Section 106A 
Accords with International Law 
Although issues relating to hot pursuit as defined by Article 111 are 
among those presented by commentators, these are not detrimental to the 
legality of the forfeiture provision.  It is in Australia’s interest to make 
certain that its forfeiture provision is interpreted consistently with LOSC, as 
this will promote international cooperation in effective fisheries 
conservation and management.185 
Some have claimed that the Olbers decisions suggest a departure from 
LOSC compliance on the part of Australia, especially its conformity with 
Article 111, relating to hot pursuit.186  In Olbers, the owners submitted that 
at the time of the boarding, Australia had not complied with all the elements 
of hot pursuit.  Although Australia responded in kind, factually arguing that 
it had satisfied these elements, Judge French reasoned that it did not matter 
because Australia was the owner of the boat when the officers boarded it.  
Expanding this reasoning to claim that Australia may board vessels on the 
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high seas it has reason to believe were violating its fisheries laws within its 
EEZ would not conform with international law, and should be avoided.  
Significantly, Australia did not argue for this interpretation in Olbers, and 
the statements on hot pursuit were not part of the holding of the case.187 
Australia’s reputation for overly strict enforcement of fisheries laws 
may have played a role in the jury’s decision to acquit the crew in the Viarsa 
I criminal proceedings.  The crew asserted that their flight from Australia’s 
EEZ stemmed from their concern that Australia would undertake illegal 
enforcement action.  Evidence of extreme enforcement measures not in 
compliance with LOSC would continue to undermine Australia’s reputation 
and discourage international cooperation. 
The Federal Court’s dismissal of the owner of the Viarsa I’s challenge 
to the forfeiture of that vessel could be problematic.  In fact, the legality of 
Australia’s actions could depend on the reasoning in the dismissal of that 
claim.  Although the FMA requires that there be reasonable grounds for 
suspicion of the alleged offense for officials to seize a vessel, thus ensuring 
some minimum factual showing for this procedure, given the high profile of 
the case, it would be beneficial to publish some sort of reasoning on the 
merits of the case.  News reports have claimed that the Australia forfeiture 
clause in uncontestable.188  This is not the intent or the effect of the 
legislation,189 and there is no reason not to allay these allegations.  The 
Viarsa plaintiffs filed several motions and there were multiple hearings.190  
Accordingly, the Australian court should make clear the reasons behind its 
dismissal of the challenge by issuing an opinion rather than a simple order. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the choice, Australia should interpret its automatic forfeiture 
provision to conform to international law in order to maintain international 
credibility and reciprocal treatment.  Such an interpretation would further 
Australia’s goal of attaining a level of sustainable fisheries management 
worldwide.  In general, vessel forfeiture is a valid coastal state enforcement 
measure to effectively deter illegal fishing in its EEZ.  Although the 
automatic nature of Australia’s forfeiture provision raises due process 
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concerns, the procedures established by the statute effectively safeguard the 
rights of the owners and flag states.  Likewise, the AFMA’s assertion that 
Australia remains bound by “prompt release” requirements protects the 
rights of a seized vessel’s flag state.  Finally, Australia’s domestic courts are 
open to foreign vessel owners or states wishing to challenge the forfeiture of 
a vessel.  As such, Section 106A of the FMA satisfies the proposed test for 
legality. 
Although the dismissals without published judgments of the appeals 
of vessel owners such as Olbers (Volga) and Navalmar (Viarsa) leave open 
questions about the legality of the Australian forfeiture provision, 
interpretation in conformity with international law is possible.  It is in 
Australia’s interest to clarify the reasoning applied in these final decisions 
regarding vessel forfeiture in order to maintain the international legitimacy 
of its maritime regulations. 
